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RETHINKING THE SENTENCING
REGIME FOR MURDER
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for improvement. The article argues that the wdsting
classification of murder into first- and second-degree,
and the harsh periods of parole ineligibility attached to
a murder coniiction should both be abolished. The
author argues for a compromise position, %hicl would
maintain the important distinction between
manslaughter and murder and yet allow sufficiant
flexlbiy for trial judges to ensure that sentences for
murder, as with other crimes, can be tailored to fit the
crime
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When one thinks of murder, one is likely to think of our worst
crimes-Paul Bernardo and his confinement and killing of three young
women, or Clifford Olson and his brutal killing of eleven children. In some
respects, these cases present few sentencing challenges because there is a
general consensus that such offenders should never re-enter society.
However, not all murders lead to such consensus. For example,
Robert Latimer has twice been convicted of murder for killing his disabled
daughter, Tracy.' Despite differing opinions on the outcome of that case,
few would compare Latimer to Bernardo or Olson. Similarly, the
Department of Justice report by Madame Justice Lynn Ratushny 2 revealed
that many women are in Canadian prisons for killing abusive spouses. Most
would agree that these crimes are on the lower end of the scale, in terms of
blameworthiness for murder. In other words, murder encompasses a wide
range of offenders and offences, and thus a wide range of culpability.
Despite this wide range, there is very little flexibility in our current
sentencing regime for murder. While we do distinguish between first- and
second-degree murder, this distinction is only relevant for setting the
period of parole ineligibility.

1

IKv. Latimer(1994), 124 Sask. R. 180 (Sask. Ct. Q.B.), affd (1995), 99 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (Sask.
C.A.), [1997]1 S.C.R. 217, (1997), 121 C.C.C. (3d) 326, rev'd (1998), 131 C.C.C. (3d) 191 (Sask. C.A.),
aff'd [2001] 1 S.C.R. 3, (2001), 150 C.C.C. (3d) 129 [hereinafter Latimer.
2 Canada, Self Defence Review: Women in Custody (Ottawa: Department of Justice, 1997) (Final
Report by Justice Lynn Ratushny) [hereinafter Ratushny Reporti .

2001]

Rethinking the Sentencing Regime for Murder

This article vill review the law of murder in Canada, with a view to
determiningwhether the current sentencingprovisionsmeet society's needs
for dealing with our most serious crime. There are two components to the
current sentencing regime. First, every murder is punishable by life
imprisonment. Second, depending on whether the murder is classified as
first- or second-degree, there are periods of parole ineligibility attached to
that life sentence. It will be argued that this mandatory life sentence is too
rigid and may result in the imposition of unfair sentences in some cases. It
will be further argued that the classification of murders into first- and
second-degree has lost its usefulness since the abolition of the death
penalty, and that it fails to adequately distinguish the most blameworthy
killings from the relatively less blameworthy ones.
This article begins with a brief description of the scope of the crime
of murder in Canada. This includes an analysis of the Supreme Court of
Canada's constitutional jurisprudence that limited the definition of murder
to intentional and reckless killings. The article then sets out the existing
sentencing regime for murder. After arguing that the mandatory sentences
are too rigid, and after rejecting degrees of murder as a classification
system, the article examines alternative sentencing regimes enacted in
other jurisdictions. These include the United States, England, and
Australia. Finally, the article presents recommendations for reform of the
sentencing regime for murder in Canada.
II.

THE DEFINITION OF MURDER

Prior to the proclamation of the Canadian Charterof Rights and
Freedoms, Canada had a gradation of murder offences. These ranged from4
intentional killings and reckless killings in what is now section 229(a),
unlawful object murderss in what is now section 229(c)," and constructive
murders in the since repealed section 230.: In constructive murder, death
must take place during the commission of various other enumerated
offences, such as robbery and sexual assault.

3 Part I of the ConstitutionAct, 19S2, being Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982 (U.IL), 1932, c
I I [hereinafter Charter].
4 CriminalCode, R.S.C. 19S5. c. C-46, s. 229(a) [hereinafter Codel.
5 Unlawful object murder imposed an objectie test, such that if an accused ought to hatc knom
he or she was likely to cause death, a conviction %wuld
follo-w.

6 Supra note 4, s. 229(c).
7 Ibid., s. 230.
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In a series of cases, the Supreme Court of Canada initially limited
the definition of murder to killings where death was objectively foreseeable
(to a reasonable person). This definition was then further limited to killings
where the death itself was actually foreseen, or at least where bodily harm
likely to cause death was actually foreseen. Because these cases have been
discussed at length elsewhere, they will only be briefly reviewed here.8
In R. v. Vailancourt,9 the Court faced a challenge to then section
213(d) of the Code, the most criticized form of constructive murder. That
section provided that if an accused used a weapon, or had it during the
commission of certain specified crimes, or during the escape from those
crimes, and a death resulted, that death constituted murder. The section
did not require actual foresight of death, nor that death be foreseeable to
the reasonable person. In Vaillancourt, the majority held that for crimes
with a "special stigma," such as murder, there had to be at least objective
foresight of the element of the offence that made the crime blameworthy.
The majority (per Mr. Justice Lamer, as he then was) posited that some
crimes have such a serious social stigma attached to them that the
principles of fundamental justice in section 7 of the Charterrequire some
level of mens rea with respect to the causing of the harm. In the context of
murder, this harm is death. Vaillancourt was the first case to raise this
concept of "stigma," and it was neither clearly defined nor were its origins
0 the majority of the
discussed. Soon after Vaillancourt,in R. v. Martineau,"
Court extended this reasoning, holding that the principles of fundamental
justice require actual foresight of death before an accused can be convicted
of murder.
The requirement of subjective foresight was not strictly necessary
to decide Martineau, which dealt with then section 213(a) of the Code,
because the principle of objective foresight could have invalidated the
section. However, the majority indicated that it wanted to state a principle
that would prevent the case from returning to the Court with a challenge
to the objective test in then section 212(c) [now section 229(c)]-unlawful
object murder. Although this section was not before the Court in

8 See, for example, 1. Grant, "The Impact of Vaillancourtv. The Queen on Canadian
Criminal
Law" (1990) 28 Alta. L. Rev. 443; 1. Grant, D.Chunn & C. Boyle, The Law of Homicide, looseleaf
(Toronto: Carswell, 1994) c. 4. [hereinafter Homicide]; D. Stuart, CanadianCriminalLaw: A Treatise,
3rd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1995) c. 3.

9 [19871 2 S.C.R. 636 [hereinafter Vaillancourt].
10 [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633 [hereinafter Martineau].
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Martineau,the majority cast considerable doubt on the constitutionality of
the objective component of section 229(c) [then section 212(c)].
In Martineau,the majority developed the concept of stigma, but
also noted that the punishment for a crime must be proportionate to the
blameworthiness of the offender. The majority held that section 213(a)
violated that principle. Murder has the most serious punishment known to
our criminal justice system, yet the fault requirement-the intent to cause
bodily harm and the intent to commit the underlying offence-was not
proportionate to the blameworthiness of murder." While the focus in
Vaillancourt had been on the stigma attached to murder, Martineau
resulted in a welcome shift towards proportionality.
Soon after Martineau, however, the Court shifted its focus from
proportionality back to stigma. In R. v. Logan,"2 the Court held that the
offence of attempted murder was a special stigma crime. Thus, an accused
who was a party to that offence could only be convicted if he or she
intended to cause or was reckless with respect to causing death. Because
attempted murder has no mandatory penalty, the proportionality analysis
would have been more difficult to apply. The majority once again focused
on the stigma attached to attempted murder, and on its close relationship
to the crime of murder. An accused convicted of attempted murder was
simply a "lucky murderer" 3 whose victim did not die. The majority
explicitly put the emphasis on stigma rather than on the seriousness of the
punishment. 14 In Logan, Mr. Justice Lamer stated that in determining the
constitutionally required level of fault, "...the social stigma associated with
a conviction is the most important consideration, not the sentence.""
The definition of murder in 2002 is much more limited than it was
before the Charter.Section 229 now reads:
Culpable homicide is murder

liThe majority did not address the approach of Madame Justice L'Heureun-Dube. She held that
anyone who intends to cause bodily harm during the commie:ion of a robbery. !ceual assault. or other
such crimes, ought to have foreseen death. In other v,ords, she held that then :ction 213(a) did
require objective foresight of death, which, according to the ratio in IJadlanco:urt,v.as all that va5
required.
12 [19901 2 S.C.R. 731 [hereinafter Logaan].
13 INid at 743.
14 Note that attempted murder currently does have a mandatory mimmum -entcnce
%-.herea
firearm is used, but this vas not in effect at the time of these cases.
15
Supra note 12 at 743.
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where the person who causes the death of a human being
(i)

means to cause his death, or

(ii)

means to cause him bodily harm that he knows is likely to cause his
death, and is reckless whether death ensues or not;

(b)

where a person, meaning to cause death to a human being, or meaning to cause
him bodily harm that he knows is likely to cause his death, and being reckless
whether death ensues or not, by accident or mistake causes death to another
human being, notwithstanding that he does not mean to cause death or bodily
harm to that human being; or

(c)

where a person, for an unlawful object, does anything that he knows orought to
have known is likely to cause death, and thereby causes death to a human being,
notwithstanding that he desires to effect his object without causing death or
bodily harm to any human being. 6

While section 229(c) still stands, the Supreme Court of Canada
indicated in Martineau that the objective test in that section probably
violates the Charter. However, because it has not been subjected to a
section 1 Charter analysis, it is unclear whether the section would be
upheld. It is still utilized by the Crown, but not frequently. 7
Having examined how the Supreme Court has limited the definition
of murder, it is necessary to examine both the existing sentencing regime
for murder and judicial challenges to that regime.
III.

EXISTING SENTENCES FOR MURDER

As described above, there are two parts to the sentence for
murder-a mandatory life sentence and a period of parole ineligibility

attached to that sentence.' The length of the parole ineligibility period
depends upon the offender's age and on the distinction between first- and
second-degree murder.1 9
This distinction evolved from the earlier distinction between capital

and non-capital murder. When the death penalty was abolished in 1976 for

16

Supra note 4, s. 229 [emphasis added].

17

SeeR. v.Menard, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 109 [hereinafterMenard];R.v. Meiler (1999), 136 C.C.C. (3d)
11 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafterMeilerl;R.v.D.A.H. (1997), 120 C.C.C. (3d) 533 (B.C. C.A.) [hereinafter
D.A.H.];R. v. Nette (1999), 141 C.C.C. (3d) 130 (B.C C.A.);R. v. Nienhuis (1991), 12 W.C.B. (2d) 106
(Alta. C.A.). The proper approach to section 229(c) is to read out the objective test as was done in
Meiler.Failure to do so may sometimes result in a new trial (D.A.H), but not always (Menard).
18
Code, supra note 4, s. 745.
19Ibid., s. 745.1 (a).
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all non-military crimes, it was replaced vth the current regime of first- and
second-degree murder, with the mandatory life sentence, and lengthy
parole ineligibility periods. The criteria for rendering a murder first-degree,
however, have been expanded beyond the requirements for capital murder.
When the death penalty was abolished, capital murder applied only to the
murder of a police officer or a prison guard.-"
The Supreme Court of Canada has held that the distinction
between first- and second-degree murder is one that exists only for
sentencing purposes 1 The trier of fact first determines whether the
accused is guilty of murder under the definitions in section 229 of the Code.
If a determination of guilt is made, the trier of fact must then consider how
to classify that murder for the purpose of sentencing.

A.

First-DegreeMurder

A trial judge has no discretion in sentencing an offender convicted
of first-degree murder. Adults convicted of first-degree murder are subject
to a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment with twenty-five years of
parole ineligibility. 2 There is no allowance for gradations in culpability for
those convicted of first-degree murder. However, as vill be discussed
below, anyone who is serving a sentence with a parole ineligibility period
of fifteen years or more may apply to have that period of parole ineligibility
reduced after serving fifteen years?
Section 2312 of the Code identifies certain kinds of murders as
being first-degree. Premeditated murders, murders for hire, murders of
police and prison officials, and murders during the commission of certain
offences are all characterized as first-degree. This section provides that:
(1)

Murder is first degree or second degree murder.

(2)

Murder is first degree murder %.henit is planned and deliberate.

(3)

Without limiting the generality of subsection (2), murder is planned and
deliberate when it is committed pursuant to an arrangement underwvhtch money
or anything of value passes or is intended to pass from one person to another, or
is promised by one person to another, as consideration for that other's cau.ing

20 CriminalCode, S.C. 1953-54, c. C-51, s. 202A(2); Iftmride,supra note 8 at 7-6.
21 R. v. Farrant,[19S3] I S.CR. 124

22 Code, supra note 4, s. 745(a).
23Ibid., s. 745.6(1).
24 Ibid, s. 231.
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or assisting in causing the death of anyone or counselling another person to do
any act causing or assisting in causing that death.
(4)

(5)

25

Irrespective of whether a murder is planned and deliberate on the part of any
person, murder is first degree murder when the victim is
(a)

a police officer, police constable, constable, sheriff, deputy sheriff,
sheriff's officer or other person employed for the preservation and
maintenance of the public peace, acting in the course of his duties;

(b)

a warden, deputy warden, instructor, keeper, jailer, guard or other
officer or a permanent employee of a prison, acting in the course of
his duties; or

(c)

a person working in a prison with the permission of the prison
authorities and acting in the course of his work therein

Irrespective of whether a murder is planned and deliberate on the part of any
person, murder is first degree murder in respect of a person when the death is
caused by that person while committing or attempting to commit an offence
under one of the following sections;
(a)

... (hijacking an aircraft);

(b)

... (sexual assault);

(c)

... (sexual assault with a weapon, threats to a third party or causing
bodily harm);

(d)

... (aggravated sexual assault);

(e)

... (kidnapping and forcible confinement); or

(0

... (hostage taking).

(6)

Irrespective of whether a murder is planned and deliberate on the part of any
person, murder is first degree murder when the death is caused by that person
while committing or attempting to commit an offence under section 264 [criminal
harassment] and the person committing that offence intended to cause the
person murdered to fear for the safety of the person murdered or the safety of
anyone known to the person murdered.

(6.01)

Irrespective of whether a murder is planned and deliberate on the part of a
person, murder is first degree murder where the death is caused while
committing or attempting to commit and indictable offence under this or any
other Act of Parliament where the act or omission constituting the offence also
constitutes a terrorist activity.'

(6.1)

Irrespective of whether a murder is planned and deliberate on the part of a
person murder is first degree murder when the death is caused while committing

An Act to Amend the Criminal Code, the Official Secrets Act, the Canada Evidence Act, the

Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) Act and other Acts, and to enact measures respecting the
registrationof charities,in orderto combat terrorism, S.C. 2001, c. C-41, s. 9.
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or attempting to commit an offence under sction 31 [using e~plos~es] for the
benefit of, at the direction of or a .cationvith a criminal organization

B.

Second-DegreeMurder

There is no definition of second-degree murder in the Code.
Rather, it is a residual category for all murders that are not first-degree.
Second-degree murders are subject to a period of parole ineligibility of
between ten and twenty-five years.' That period is determined by the trial
judge, who asks the jury to recommend a period of parole ineligibility
within that range. The trial judge should consider the recommendation, but
is not bound by it. Section 745.4 provides that the judge should consider the
nature of the offence, the circumstances of its commission, and the
circumstances of the offender.23 Because the maximum sentence for
second-degree murder is the same as that for first-degree murder, one
might assume that the worst second-degree murders are on par with firstdegree murder. Thus, the distinction between the two categories merges at
this point. The range in the period of parole ineligibility of ten to twentyfive years recognizes that some second-degree murders are more
blameworthy than others. In fact, the majority of second-degree murders
result in periods of parole ineligibility closer to ten years than to twentyfive.
C.

Sentencing Offenders Under Eighteen Wto are Tried as Adults

Offenders who were under eighteen at the time the murder was
committed, but who are tried as adults, are subject to lower periods of
parole ineligibility. If the offender was sixteen or seventeen when the
murder was committed, the parole ineligibility period will be ten years for
first-degree murder and seven years for second-degree murder. " If the
offender was younger than sixteen when the crime was committed, the
parole ineligibility will be between five and seven years. These rules only
apply to young offenders who are transferred to adult court. Offenders

26 If an accused convicted of murder has preiously been convicted of any form of murder, he
or she is to be sentenced to life imprisonment with no parole eligibility for tvent-five yeara Ceon if

the murder is still technically of the second-degree. See Cede, supra note 4, 5,745(b).
27

Ibd, s. 745(c).

25 Ibids. 745.4.
29 Ibid., ss. 745.1(b),
(c).
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dealt with under the Young Offenders Act" will be sentenced according to
it.
D.

The "FaintHope" Clause

Section 745.6 of the Code allows those who have been sentenced to
more than fifteen years of parole ineligibility to apply for a reduction after
serving fifteen years in prison. 31 This provision has been referred to as the
"faint hope" clause. Those who have committed more than one murder are
not entitled to apply. 32 Before a full hearing can be held, the applicant must
satisfy the Chief Justice of the province in which the conviction took place
that there is a reasonable prospect that the application will succeed. If that
burden is met, then a jury will be empaneled to decide whether or not to
lower the period of parole ineligibility. The criteria include, but are not
limited to, the character of the applicant, his or her conduct while
imprisoned, the nature of the crime, and any information provided by the
victim's relatives.33 It is important to note that reductions in parole
ineligibility by juries do not necessarily lead to the offender's release. The
Parole Board determines whether to release the offender on parole. The
jury's decision simply determines the earliest time at which the offender will
be eligible to apply for parole.
IV. CHARTER CHALLENGES TO THE EXISTING
SENTENCING REGIME
A.

First-DegreeMurder

There have been several Charter challenges to the sentencing
provisions for first-degree murder, most of which have focused on the
mandatory nature of the parole ineligibility period. Unlike its activism in
dealing with the definition of murder, the Supreme Court has shown more
deference to Parliament in assessing the mandatory penalties.

30 R.S.C. 1985, c. Y-1, s. 20(1)(k.1)
31 Code, supra note 4, s. 745.6.
32 Ibid., s. 745.6(2).
33 Ibid, ss. 745.6(1), 745.6(3).
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The two leading cases are R. v.Arkelf 4 and R. v. Luxton.A InArkell,
the challenge focused on section 231(5).7 In Luxton, the accused
challenged both section 231(5) and the mandatory minimum twenty-five
year parole ineligibility period for first-degree murder. In both eases, the
Court relied heavily on findings from its decision in Martineau,which was
handed down the same day. The Court held in Martineau that murder
requires either intention or recklessness with respect to causing death.
Thus, it was no longer possible for accidental or negligent killings to be
elevated to first-degree murder under section 231(5). This finding w',as
particularly significant because prior to Vlailtancourt and Martineau,
accidental dllings during the commission of certain crimes could be
elevated to first-degree murder, through the combination of section 230
and section 231(5).
In disposing of the section 7 argument in Arkell, Chief Justice
Lamer revisited the underlying rationale of section 231(5), as set out by the
Court inR. v. Parj?7 The rationale is that all murders withinsection 231(5)
take place when the accused is unlavfully dominating the victim, and it is
this unlawful domination which justifies the additional fifteen years of
parole ineligibility. There is no principle of fundamental justice, the Court
held, that precludes Parliament from classifying murders committed during
the commission of certain underlying offences as being more serious than
others. Accordingly, Parliament may attach a more serious penalty:
Parliament's decision to treat more seriously murder, that ha e been committed vhilc the
offender is exploiting a position of poijer through illegal domination of the victim accord;
with the principle that there must be a proportionality betv;een the sentence and the moral
blameworthiness of the offender and other considerations such a: deterrence and =etal
condemnation of the acts of the offender.'

In Luxton, the Court held that Parliament had clearly adhered to
the principle that there must be proportionality between moral
blameworthiness and punishment of the offender. The majority also
emphasized that proportionality between the sentencing scheme and the
seriousness of the offence is only one factor in assessing the

[1990] 2 S.C.R. 695 [hereinafterArkellJ.
35 11990) 2 S.C.R. 711 [hereinafter Luaion].
36
Supra note 4, s. 231(5).
37 [1937] 2 S.C.R. 61S [hereinafter Pare.
3
,Arkde, supra note 34 at 214-1 5.
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constitutionality of a sentencing scheme. A just sentencing scheme must
also take into account the societal interest in punishing wrongdoers
in
3
terms of protection, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution.
On reading the sentencing cases, one senses that the Court was
retreating from its own activism in the mens rea cases. Some of the defence
arguments against the mandatory sentence were given little attention. First,
the Court failed to address the impact on an offender of a twenty-five year
period of parole ineligibility. 0 Even though most offenders can apply after
fifteen years to have that period reduced, as the name "faint hope" clause
suggests, a reduction is not guaranteed. Moreover, release is still not
guaranteed after serving the twenty-five year period. Literature suggests
that prison violence, both self-inflicted and against others, is higher among
those sentenced to these long, indeterminate periods of imprisonment."
Second, the Court failed to consider whether there could be a range
of blameworthiness that might come within a particular category of firstdegree murder. This is perhaps most easily illustrated in the context of
planned and deliberate killings. The category ranges from the planned
killing of an ailing, terminally ill spouse, to the planned, deliberate, and
brutal murder of a child.
Third, the Court's suggestion that Parliament has been sensitive to
the particular circumstances of each offender through various provisions
(for the royal prerogative of mercy, and for escorted absences from custody
for humanitarian and rehabilitative purposes) ignored the fact that these
options are entirely discretionary. As we have seen recently in cases
involving wrongful convictions for murder, seeking relief through the42royal
prerogative of mercy may be cumbersome and take years to pursue.
Finally, the Court did not address the possible misuse of the firstdegree murder provisions to induce inappropriate plea agreements. As
discussed below, an accused facing the risk of a mandatory twenty-five years
of parole ineligibility might plead guilty to a lesser offence, even where a

R. v. Lyons, [19871 2 S.C.R. 309. The Court also rejected the section 9 and
section 12
arguments under the Charter. The Court held that Parliament was free to impose a very severe penalty
on our most serious crime.
40
Allan Manson, "The Easy Acceptance of Long Term Confinement in Canada"
(1990) 79 C.R.

(3d) 265,
R. Lorean Scanlon & Frank J. Porporino, Homicide Offenders Imprisoned
in Canada:A
Descriptive Study of Offender, Offence and Victim Characteristics (Ottawa, 1987) at 23-24; Homicide,
supra note 8 at 7-33.
42 R. v. Milgaard, [1971] 2 W.W.R. 266 (Sask. C.A.); leave to appeal to S.C.C refused (1971), 4
C.C.C. (2d) 566 (S.C.C.); Reference Re Milgaard,f19921 1S.C.R. 866.
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potential defence edists to all charges. The stakes involved in first-degree
murder are so high that the possibility of the Crown overcharging to
pressure an accused into a plea agreement is serious.

Provincial appellate courts have rejected challenges to other forms

of first-degree murder. R. v. Bowen4 ' is the most recent of three appellate

decisions to discuss whether section 231(4)," which automatically elevates
the murder of police officers, prison guards, and othervulnerable members

of the criminal justice system to first-degree murder, violates section 12 of
the Charter ' The Alberta Court of Appeal dismissed the accused's attack

on the constitutionality of the combined effect of sections 231(4) and 745:
As noted, the additional element required for first-degree murder is that the victim is a
police officer executing his or her dutv. That alfray; implies an etra degree of
blameworthiness because it means that the actused has also stop;:ed the officer from doing
his or her duty. When one recalls the serious duties ofa pIzeace officer that is obtnu-y and
ahvays a serious aggravating factor. '

Mister Justice Cbt6 held that in order to have succeeded on the
section 12 claim, the accused would have needed to present some
hypothetical scenario in which an individual who killed a police officer
should be sentenced to less than fifteen years of parole ineligibilityf Since
no such scenario could be envisioned, the section 12claim was unsuccessful.
Similarly, the British Columbia Court of Appeal upheld section
231(2), 4S which elevates planned and deliberate murders to first-degree
murder. In R. v. Cairns,49 the accused appealed the life sentence imposed
for his first-degree murder conviction. He argued that the sentence

43 (1990),2 CR. (4th) 225 (Alta. CA).
44 Code, supra note 4, s. 231(4).
45 See also . v. Collins (1989), 69 CR. (3d) 235 (Ont, CA.) [hereinafter Ca!,sJ and
R? v,
LefebTre (1989), 71 CR. (3d) 213. In Collins,the Ontario Court of ApTpal held that thi rciton only
survived the constitutional challenge because knovwledge or reckI
s) of the identiw of the wctm
was read in. This decision countered the Courts prewious ebiterinL ,. Mwwo (19,391,3fI C R, l3dt

193 (Ont. CA.).
46

Bowen, supra note 43 at 232.

47

Note here that the Court is incorporating the faint hope clause of s. 745 611) into it5 analci5

of s. 231(4), which allows an accused convicted of first-degree murder to apply for a reduction in the
tventy-fihv year period of parole ineligibility after fifteen ycars.
48
Supra note 4, s. 231(2).
49(19S9). 51 CC.C. (3d) 90 (BC. CA).
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constituted cruel and unusual punishment, contrary to section 12 of the
Charter.In rejecting this argument, Madame Justice Southin remarked:
I cannot see that 25 years in prison for the planned and deliberate taking of another human
life is "cruel or unusual treatment or punishment". It is a great deal less "cruel" than the
treatment Cairns inflicted on Mr. Parks."°

B.

Second-DegreeMurder

Fewer challenges have been launched against sentences for seconddegree murder; perhaps because of the discretion allowed trial judges in
setting the parole ineligibility period. In R. v. Mitchell,5' the Nova Scotia
Court of Appeal was unsympathetic to the accused's constitutional
challenge to the life sentence and mandatory minimum ten-year period of
parole ineligibility for second-degree murder. The Court not only dismissed
the accused's cross-appeal, but ultimately allowed the Crown's appeal,
raising the accused's period of parole ineligibility from fifteen to twentyone years. The circumstances in Mitchell made the case particularly
unsympathetic, as it involved the death of a child following a long period
of abuse.
C.

The CharterChallenge in Latimer: Highlightingthe Need for Reform

All of the challenges to the sentencing regime for murder discussed
above, arose in circumstances that were less than sympathetic. In addition,
they all involved challenges to the legislation itself. The constitutional
challenge in Latimerwas different. Latimer did not argue that the existing
sentences for murder were unconstitutional. Rather, he argued that the
application of the statutory penalties to him, given the facts of his case,
would result in cruel and unusual punishment. Thus, he was asking for a
constitutional exemption to the existing penalties for murder.
Latimer was twice convicted of second-degree murder by juries in
Saskatchewan for the murder of his daughter Tracy. Tracy was born with
cerebral palsy and had multiple physical and developmental disabilities.
Tracy was a quadriplegic and bedridden for much of her life. She had
several seizures each day and was in constant pain.52 She had undergone

50

1bid. at 104.
51(1987), 39 C.C.C. (3d) 141 (N.S. C.A.) [hereinafter Mitchell.
52 These facts are taken from the first Court of Appeal judgment in Latimer,supranote
1,(1995),
99 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (Sask. C.A.).

Rethinkng the Sentencing Regime for Murder

2001]

surgery in the past and was facing another surgery for a dislocated hip. On
the day of her murder, while the rest of his family was out, Latimer put
Tracy in his truck, set up a hose device from the exhaust, and shut all the
windows, so that Tracy would be asph.xiated. After her death, he brought
her back to bed, and attempted to persuade police that she had died of
natural causes. He later confessed.
After his first conviction for second-degree murder, Latimer
appealed to the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal. That Court was divided as
to whether the mandatory sentence was constitutional. The division in the
Court reflected the vast differences in public opinion surrounding this case.
The majority judgment by Justice Tallis (Justice Sherstobitoff
concurring) had two central themes. The first focused on the seriousness
of the crime in question, and on the appropriateness of the existing
sentence for that crime. The second theme was that of deference to
Parliament in setting the sentences for murder.
The majority focused on the fact that Tracy wvas disabled and that
the killing resulted from that fact. According to the majority, Latimer
murdered Tracy because she had a disability, not because she was in pain.
The majority posed what it considered a pivotal question:
If the child were not permanently disabled. but in extreme pain, mauld there be any
question about making heroic efforts to sustain and maintain Ife? If the anser i no, then
the decision would appear to be clearly prcdicatcd upon the diminished alue, a-gned to
the life of a handicapped child. One %%ouldnot be so inspired by loe and compax:on to
take the life of the non-handicapped child."

The Court held that it was important for society to express its
outrage at such a crime, particularly given the vulnerability of the victim.
Society cannot condone anyone making life and death decisions for another
person.
The majority indicated that its proper role was to interpret
Parliament's laws, not to write them. It noted that Parliament had
prescribed the sentences it felt appropriate for first- and second-degree
murder. If Parliament wanted to provide an exception for "mercy" killings,
it was open for it to do so. It also relied on the passage from Chief Justice
Lamer in Luxton, noting that Parliament had been sensitive to the
circumstances of each offender by allowing the royal prerogative of mercy,
escorted absences from custody for humanitarian reasons, and early parole.

53 Ibd at 519.
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The dissent by Chief Justice Bayda focused on Tracy's pain. He
held that Latimer acted out of compassion stemming from her pain, not
because she had a disability. The dissent considered the public reaction to
Latimer's sentencing and the letters that had been sent in his support to
justify the conclusion that the mandatory minimum sentence would be cruel
and unusual if applied to Latimer.
The Supreme Court of Canada ordered a new trial for Latimer on
grounds unrelated to this constitutional challenge.54 At his second trial,
Latimer was again convicted of second-degree murder. After conviction,
Mr. Justice Noble considered Latimer's section 12 argument, that the
mandatory life sentence with ten years parole ineligibility would be cruel
and unusual. He held that there were differences in the second trial that
justified departing from the Court of Appeal's first decision. Perhaps most
importantly, the jury had asked during its deliberations, if it could have
input into sentencing. When asked for a recommendation on parole
ineligibility, the jury recommended a period of one year, not a period
between ten to twenty-five years as provided by law.
In deciding whether the sentence was grossly disproportionate,
Justice Noble found Latimer to be "a devoted family man with a loving and
caring nature."55 He had no criminal record and was not a threat to society.
In concluding that Latimer acted out of love and compassion, seeking to
end his daughter's pain, Justice Noble held that Latimer's culpability was
at the lowest end of the scale. He suggested that the jury must have felt the
same way. Thus, he allowed the constitutional exemption and sentenced
Latimer to one year in prison and one year probation.
The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal overturned the judgment of
Justice Noble, and held that Latimer must be sentenced to the mandatory
minimum sentence. It held that there was no basis, evidentiary or legal, for
the trial judge to distinguish the first appellate decision. Thus, the Court
imposed the mandatory minimum penalty on Latimer.
On further appeal to the Supreme Court, the Court unanimously
dismissed Latimer's appeal, and denied that the circumstances of the killing
merited a "constitutional exemption" under section 12 of the Charter.
While the Court appeared to leave open the possibility that an exemption
would be available under certain circumstances, it held that for Latimer,
the mandatory minimum punishment for second-degree murder was not
cruel and unusual. This conclusion was based on the view that the murder

54

Latimer,supranote 1, [ 1997]1 S.C.R.
217.
55 Latimer,supra note 1, (1997), 121 C.C.C. (3d) 326 at
340.
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of Tracy, while an "error in judgment" by a distraught and otherwise loving
parent, was a highly culpable act.
The Court considered the character of Latimer's actions, and the
consequences of those actions as they related to the gravity of the offence.
The Court declined to consider Latimer's motive in killing Tracy; the
character of the offence was to be determined by reference to the accused's
mens rea and his knowledge of the law. The Court noted that seconddegree murder was an act of extreme blameworthiness, in that it required
proof of subjective foresight of death.
The Court went on to consider the characteristics of the offender
and the particular circumstances of the offence. The Court concluded that
the aggravating circumstances of initial attempts at concealment; lack of
remorse; planning and premeditation; and his position of trust over Tracy,
outweighed the mitigating factors of Latimer's character, reputation, and
concern and perseverance as a parent.
The Court acknowledged that imposing the mandatory penalty on
Latimer did not further the sentencing goals of specific deterrence or
rehabilitation. However, the Court was of the view that the denunciatory
aspect of the sentence could serve the function of general deterrence. This
principle, the Court noted, was "...particularly [applicable] where the victim
is a vulnerable
person with respect to age, disability, or other similar
56
factors."
The Court did acknowledge the considerable public controversy
that eisted over Latimer's conviction, noting the existence of the royal
57 The Court explicitly
prerogative of mercy in section 749 of the CodeY
declined to comment on whether this provision should be applied. It did
suggest that the considerations under that section were not identical to the
section 12 analysis, and could include the effect of the seven-year legal
process on Latimer and his family. The Court did not deal at length with
any of the more general arguments against mandatory minimum sentences.
While noting the considerable difference of opinion on the wisdom of such
sentences, the Court deferred to Parliament on this issue.
Latimer demonstrates that when a case becomes polarized in the
media, basic legal principles may be forgotten. For example, some argued
that if Latimer were not given the full weight of the la%,, it would devalue
the lives of his daughter and other persons with disabilities. It was also
argued that this could encourage other caregivers to kill their children with

Latimer,supra note 1, [2001] 1 S+C.R. 3 at 41.
57

Supra note 4, s. 749.
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impunity. At the other extreme, Latimer was used as a vehicle for arguing
in favour of mercy killing. In the opinions of some people, Latimer should
not have been punished because what he did was not blameworthy.
In my view, both of these extreme positions miss the mark.
Lenience for Latimer does not necessarily devalue the life of his daughter
or other persons with disabilities. It does not necessarily lead to impunity
for others who kill children with disabilities. It has long been accepted that
sentencing should involve a consideration of the circumstances of both
offence and offender. If there is a reason to show compassion to a
particular offender, that does not necessarily devalue the life of their victim.
Robert Latimer found himself in extremely difficult circumstances. He was
faced with a child in pain about which he could do very little. His
response-killing his daughter-was wrong and warranted punishment.
However, it was not on par with many other second-degree murders.
On the other hand, Latimer was not about mercy killing. Mercy
killing involves the ending of a life for someone who is terminally ill. This
generally occurs with the consent of that person or, where the person is not
competent to give consent, with the consent of a substitute decision maker.
Mercy killing is about hastening an already impending death in order to
minimize the suffering of the individual. Any attempt to legalize mercy
killing must incorporate careful safeguards so that the potential for abuse
is minimized. The killing of Tracy Latimer was not a mercy killing. Robert
Latimer alone made the decision to kill his daughter. She was not
consulted, nor was her physician. Latimer was the decision maker as well
as the one carrying out the final act. Advocates of mercy killing would do
well to find a better case to use as support for its decriminalization.
The killing inLatimerwasdifferent not because Tracy was disabled,
but because the accused was motivated by compassion. While all lives are
equally valuable, not all killers are equally deserving of the same degree of
punishment. Our legal system recognizes that other forms of extreme
emotion may mitigate the seriousness of a killing. Provocation, for
example, reduces murder to manslaughter in order to enable the judge to
exercise flexibility in sentencing. A person who kills under duress may have
a complete defence if the common law defence is open to him or her.58
However, there is no defence of extreme emotional distress for a caregiver
who, for whatever reason, cannot carry on. For most crimes, these facts
would be considered at sentencing. For murder, however, there is little
room to consider mitigating factors at sentencing.

58 Homicide, supra note 8 at 6-70.
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Latimer has brought the issue of sentencing for murder into the
public spotlight again. In contrast to the usual call for harsher sentences for
murder, many believe the mandatory life sentence with ten-year parole
ineligibility was too harsh for Latimer.
Before addressing concerns with the existing sentencing regime for
murder, it is helpful to review briefly the statistics on murder, to determine
what they tell us about our most serious crime.
V.

THE SOCIAL REALITY OF MURDER IN CANADA

With the obvious exception of Latimer,almost all the cases to reach
the Supreme Court of Canada regarding the nens rea for murder, or
sentencing for murder, have involved cases where the victim was unknownii
to the accused. 59 This is probably consistent with how most Canadians think
about murder: the violent stranger. However, the reality of homicide in
Canada differs from the public perception. While surveys suggest that the
average Canadian is most afraid of murder or violent crime perpetrated by
a stranger, 40 per cent of all homicide victims are killed by family members,
and 45 per cent are killed by acquaintances.P In 1998, over half of all
female homicide victims were killed by a person with whom they had an
intimate relationship at some time in the past. According to the Canadian
Centre for Justice Statistics, the time of greatest risk for being a homicide
victim is during the first year of life. These figures belie the notion that
murder is committed by the violent stranger. In fact, we are most in danger
from those around us, and often, those with whom we have had our most
intimate relationships. 2
The ratio of males to females accused of homicide has remained
stable over the recent past, with males constituting approximately 88 per
cent of all those charged with homicide, and also 66 per cent of all victims.
The homicide rate generally is declining, and has been since the mid-1970's.

59 One case not discussed in this article is& v.S t,
1149113 S.CR. 124, rc'6g. l9S9),47C-C.C
(3d) 45 (Ont. C.A.). Mr. Sit devised a plot to adnap his cousin and demand a ransom, Sit'%
accomplices murdered the cousin and Sit %,ascharged as a party to the murder. The Supreme Court
found that the sectionsunderwhich Sit wascharged- ceons213(c) and 21 2)--contraeneds=clions
7 and 1l(d) of the Chaner,and were not justified under section 1 of the Chartcr.The aceuzed in
Martineaudid not know, his victims.
60 0. Fedorowycz, "Homicide in Canada 1993" t 144 9) 19 Juristat No. 10
61

Ibid. at 10.

62 For more discussion about our misperccptions regarding the nature of wolent crime, sec
L
Grant, "Legislating Public Safety: The Business of RtAs 11993) 3 Can Cnm.LR. 177.
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This was when Canada abolished the death penalty, suggesting that
abolition of the death penalty did not cause an increase in homicides. The
rate is declining in the United States as well, although the United States
still has three to four times the rate of homicide as Canada when controlled
for population differences. 63 The United States notwithstanding, Canada
has a high rate of homicide relative to its population; a rate that is higher
than that in England, for example."
Despite the overall decline in the rate of homicide in Canada, the
rate of first-degree murder charges has increased since 1976. Because this
reflects charges laid and not convictions, it is possible that this statistic
reflects the willingness of the Crown to overcharge in an attempt to
facilitate plea-bargaining, rather than an increase in the most serious
murders per se.
This very brief review portrays murder more often as a crime of
intimate relationships gone terribly wrong than as a crime of psychopaths
or serial killers. While our sentencing regime obviously has to deal with
these latter offenders, they should not be the primary focus when
developing a sentencing regime for murder.
VI. PROBLEMS WITH THE EXISTING SENTENCING REGIME
FOR MURDER
The first and most significant problem with our existing sentencing
regime for murder is its lack of flexibility. The mandatory minimum life
sentence and the harsh periods of parole ineligibility do not allow for
genuine mitigating and aggravating factors to be taken fully into account.
The rigid categories of first-and second-degree murder compound this
problem. In cases such as Latimer, this inflexibility may result in unduly
harsh penalties being imposed. In 1984, the Law Reform Commission of
Canada, quoting the 1953 Report of the Royal Commission on Capital
Punishment in England, noted that, "there is perhaps no single class of
offences that varies so widely both in character and in culpability as the
class comprising those which may fall within the comprehensive common
law definition of murder." 65 While the definition of murder has been

63

Fedorowycz, supra note 60 at 3.
Ibid.

65

U.K., Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, Report of the Royal Commission on Capital

Punishment, (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1953), quoted in Canada, Law Reform
Commission of Canada Working Paper33: Homicide, (Ottawa, 1984) at 68-69.
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narrowed by the Supreme Court of Canada under the Charter,there is still
a wide range of offences included Within the category of murder.
Latimer demonstrates the problems with the inflexibility of murder
sentencing. Unlike sentencing for other crimes, with murder individual
circumstances often cannot be considered at sentencing because of the
inflexible Code provisions. Taking such circumstances into account does not
devalue the victim. Punishment in criminal law is generally tailored to fit
the crime and the criminal, not to reflect the value of the life of the victim.
Our system assumes all victims are equally valuable, whatever their
circumstances.
Other examples of cases vhere the inflexibility of murder
sentencing is unjust can be found in the Ratushny Report, which reviewed
the cases of women who had been convicted of murder for killing their
abusive spouses." Prior to R. v. Lavallee, such a woman would most likely
be convicted of murder, and sometimes even first-degree murder if she
planned the killing in advance. Harsh mandatory minimums were applied
to women who killed to protect their own lives or those of their children.
The second problem with the sentencing regime for murder is a
direct result of the inflexibility of the sentencing structure; defences have
developed that operate solely to reduce murder to manslaughter to avoid
the mandatory penalties. This makes the lawv more complicated and
difficult for juries to apply. The defence of provocation, for example, only
exists to reduce murder to manslaughter; for all other crimes provocation
may be relevant for sentencing but not for liability. 2 The defence of
provocation has been soundly criticized elsewhere for privileging the
emotion of rage over other emotions (such as despair or compassion) 9
Intoxication has also developed largely as a defence that reduces murder

66

Ratushny Report, supra note 2

67 [19901 1 S.C.R. 852.

6S Code, supranote 4, s. 232.
69

See M. Spatz, "A Lesser Crime: A Comparative Study of Legal Defences for Men Who Mili

Their Wives" (1991) 24 Col. J. of Law & Soec. Probs. 597; J. Greene, "A Provocation Defence for
Battered Women Who Kill" (1989) 12 Adelaide L. Rev. 145; A. Cote, "La rage au cpur"
(Regroupement des femmes de la Cote Nord, 1991); J. Herder, Froc-ationand Responsibhty
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) at 192; T. Pickard et aL, eds., Dimensionsof CrnminalLaw, 2nd ed
(Toronto: Emond Montgomery. 1996) at 804; L Taylor"Pro%o ked Reaon in Men and Vomen: Heat
of Passion Manslaughter and Imperfect Self-Defence" (19S6) 33 U.C.LA. L Rev. 1679; E. Sheehy,
SpecialDefencesforWomen: Outline (Ottawa: National Association of Women and the Law, 1937); J.
Abell & E. Sheehy, Criminal Law and Procedure.:Precf Defences & Be*ond, 2nd ed. (North Yor,:Captus Press, 1998); A. Ripstein & M. Thornton, "Introduction: Criminal Law" (1933) 11 Can. J. L
& Jur. 3.
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to manslaughter. If the Supreme Court had its way, this defence could lead
to an acquittal on all charges. 70 While there is no specific defence of
diminished responsibility in Canada, courts have allowed evidence of
mental illness, short of a mental disorder defence, to negate the intent for
murder, thus reducing the crime to manslaughter.71 Intoxication and mental
illness have also resulted in reductions of first-degree murder to seconddegree murder by negating the ability to plan and deliberate. 2 All these
defences developed originally to avoid the death penalty and are now used
to avoid the rigours of sentencing for murder. If there were some flexibility
in the sentencing regime, the law could be simplified for juries, and these
other factors could be left to judges at the sentencing stage.
Similarly, the offence of infanticide (which applies to a woman who
has killed her newborn child) is subject to a maximum of only five years
imprisonment. This offence would not be necessary if murder had flexible
sentences. The fact that a woman was suffering from a postpartum disorder
could be taken into account at sentencing. One of the reasons for
developing the crime of infanticide was that juries were not willing to
sentence such women to death when charged with murder, and thus
brought in acquittals or convictions for lesser offences.
Our existing regime does not necessarily designate all of the most
heinous killings first-degree murder, despite what the Supreme Court has
held in the sentencing cases. For example, a random drive-by shooting of
a child that was not planned in advance is second-degree murder. Even if
more than one child is killed, it is second-degree murder if no planning and
deliberation existed.
It is not always true that planned killings are more heinous than
impulsive, random killings. Someone who kills impulsively, for no

70 The Court in R. v.Daviault, (1994] 3 S.C.R. 63, held that extreme intoxication akin to insanity
could negate the general intent required for crimes such as manslaughter, or negate the actus reus.
Parliament quickly intervened and enacted section 33.1 of the Code, which precludes the defence of
intoxication for general intent crimes involving violence to the person. The question that remains is
whether section 33.1 will be upheld as constitutional. The constitutionality of section 33.1 has been
challenged in a number of recent cases. See e.g.: R. v. Brenton (2001), 199 D.L.R. (4'") 119; R. v. Dunn
(1999), 28 C.R. (5"') 295 (Ont. Gen. Div.) [hereinafterDunnl; R. v. Vickberg (1998), 16 C.R. (5"h) 164
(B.C. S.C.); and R. v. Decaire(I1 September 1998), Justice Festeryga (Ont. Gen. Div.) aff'd without
reasons (Ont. C.A.). Only in Dunnwas the provision found to violate the Charter.The Supreme Court
of Canada has yet to rule on the constitutionality of this provision.
71 Homicide, supra note 8 at 6-123-6-133.
72

R. v. Wallen, [19901 1 S.C.R. 827 [hereinafter Walleni (intoxication) and R. v. More, [19631

S.C.R. 522 [hereinafter More] (mental illness).
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comprehensible reason, "maybe even more cruel, dangerous, and
depraved
73
than the premeditated killer who plans the crime in advance."'
Furthermore, there are no sharp lines dividing the categories of
murder. For example, questions about how far in advance planning must
occur, 4 and whether an intoxicated or mentally ill accused can plan and
deliberate 75 have arisen. In fact, the early case law on planning and
deliberation, which is still relied upon today, was developed vhen the death
penalty was still an option. The Supreme Court of Canada gave a narrow
definition to planning and deliberation, and was willing to find ways out
through intoxication and mental illness.7 6
The current sentencing regime causes anomalies for parties to
murder as well. Consider the liability of a party to a planned and deliberate
killing. Party liability on the basis of planning and deliberation does not
adequately reflect the culpability of a party to murder. If the party thought
the principal was committing an unplanned killing, then the party is guilty
of only second-degree murder. If the party knew the principal was planning
in advance to commit the killing, then the party is guilty of first-degree
murder. 7 But is the party any more culpable in the second situation than
in the first? In both cases the party foresaw a killing or bodily harm likely
to cause death. Foreseeing the mental state of the principal should have
nothing to do with the party's culpability.
The way we assess which murders are planned and deliberate may
also, in some contexts, be problematic. The murders that are most likely to
be planned and deliberate may be those where the accused has a
relationship with the victim. Given the large percentage of murders that
take place in the context of intimate relationships, one would expect that
a large number of domestic murders would be labeled first-degree. To the
contrary, domestic murders appear more likely to be seen as crimes "in the
heat of the moment," rather than as the result of a calculated course of
abuse ending in murder. In R.v. Randhawa," for example, the accused
killed his wife with repeated blows of an axe. The Court of Appeal

73 D. Givelber, "The New Law, of Murder" (1994) 69 Indiana L. 375 at 333
74RX v. Ruptash (1932), 63 C.C.C, (2d) 132 (Alta. CA.).
75
76

Wallen, supranote 72 (intoxication) and R v. Jacquard,[1997) 1S.C.R. 314 (mental illnc.
)e
More, supranote 72.

77 See R. v McGill (1986), 15 O.A.C 266 and R. v. IMnS (1992), 71 CCC'. (3d) 490 ( c.CA)
leave to appeal to the S.C.C. refused (1992), 74 C.C.C (3d) vi (note).

78 (1990), 104 A.R. 304 (C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refuzed (1990). 111 A.R.320.
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described the murder as "the grotesque culmination of at least fifteen years
of hostility" 79 from the accused to his wife. After verbal insults were
exchanged, the accused told his wife she would be killed. Their daughter
intervened, at which time the accused dragged both mother and daughter
to the basement and searched for a weapon. The daughter broke free and
called for help, but the wife was hacked to death.
The Court of Appeal concluded that there was insufficient evidence
of planning and deliberation. The statement that the wife would die was
consistent with intent, but did not indicate planning and deliberation. The
Court held that the fact that Randhawa was looking for the axe and did not
know where it was, was evidence against planning and deliberation, as was
the fact that the accused admitted the killing to the police. Most
troublesome was the Court's statement that the brutality of the killing, in
the domestic context, often negates planning and deliberation. Even where
a man has beaten and abused his partner for a long period of time, where
he has searched for a weapon, and where the victim is told in advance that
she will die, the murder may not be first-degree. While the new section
231(6.1)80 may elevate a very small number of domestic murders to firstdegree murder, specifically those in which the accused has followed and
stalked the woman, most will remain second-degree. Where that is the case,
section 718.2(a)(ii) provides that the fact that a crime was committed
against a spouse or child is an aggravating factor. 8' This fact could be
considered in determining parole ineligibility for second-degree murder.82
Section 231(5) also presents difficulties. Certain offences are
included as warranting the label of first-degree murder based on the
unlawful domination of the victim.83 But it is sometimes very difficult to
draw the line between offences. For example, at what point does an armed
robbery (not included in section 231(5)) become a forcible confinement (an
offence included in section 231(5))? The answer is not clear in the case law,
thus giving the judge and trier of fact the opportunity to decide where the
case fits. Similarly, under section 231(5), a party is liable for first-degree

79

ibid. at 305.

80

Supra note 4, s. 231 (6.1).

81 Supra note 4, s. 718.2(a)(ii).
82

1 am not advocating longer periods of imprisonment for murder, but rather that we be careful

with respect to which killings we label as the most serious.
83 Pari,supra note 37.
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murder if he or she is a substantial or integral cause of the deathp What
if the party is one cause of the death, but not a substantial cause? Can a
meaningful line be drawn between a cause and a substantial cause, or is the
Court giving jurors flexibility to decide how much responsibility the party
should bear?
These examples illustrate some of the problems created by the need
to characterize some murders as more blameworthy than others. It is
important to remember why degrees of murder were originally developed.
The distinction between first- and second-degree murder arose out of the
distinction between capital and non-capital murder. After the abolition of
the death penalty, the retention of first-degree murder, with its
accompanying harsh penalty, was said to serve the function of appeasing
those who favoured retention of the death penalty. This purpose has
outlived its usefulness. Furthermore, as demonstrated above, first-degree
murder is neither a precise nor exhaustive categorization of the most
culpable murders. If there were flexibility in sentencing, all of the factors
set out in section 231, plus additional factors, could be taken into account.
If one accepts that distinguishing between first and second-degree
murder is not a useful mechanism in determining which murders are most
blameworthy, it is necessary to consider vhat alternatives are available.
With this in mind, the approaches taken in the United States, England, and
Australia will be examined. A brief review of each sentencing regime
reveals some of the alternatives available to law-makers.
VII. A COMPARATIVE REVIEW
A.

The United States

Since criminal law falls vithin state jurisdiction, each state has a
different sentencing regime for murder. Both states with the death penalty
and those without will be examined. This analysis presents a survey of some
of the sentencing regimes, highlighting similarities and differences with
Canada.
This task is complicated by the fact that different states have
different definitions of murder. However, since many states use degrees of
murder, one can still examine how these states identify and punish their
most serious murders. One very significant definitional difference betveen
the countries is that, in Canada, the Supreme Court has abolished "felony

4P v.Harbolde,[1993] 3 S.C.R. 306 at 323.
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murder." Many states still retain this classification. The fact that a murder
was committed during the commission of a serious crime can elevate the
murder to first-degree in Canada. However, the killing must still be
intentional or reckless before it can be called murder. In the United States,
by contrast, some states designate killings committed during the course of
a felony as murder regardless of the intent of the offender.
1.

Non-Death penalty states

Twelve states and the District of Columbia do not have the death
penalty.85 There is marked similarity between Canada and the non-death
penalty states as to what factors warrant a first-degree murder
classification. Premeditation," contract killings,87 the killing of criminal
justice officials,88 and some form of felony murder,89 are shared by Canada
and many U.S. states. There are several additional criteria found in U.S.90
states that are not found in Canada. These include multiple murders,
killings by poison, 9' and the killing of a witness in a criminal proceeding. 92

85 Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, North Dakota, Rhode
Island, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. This information is current to July, 2001.
86
See e.g. Iowa, Ia. Stat., tit. 16 § 707.2(1) (1996) [hereinafterlowa Code]; Massachusetts, Ma.
Stat. Ann., ch. 265 § 2 (1999) [hereinafter Mass. Ann. Laws]; Michigan, Mi. Stat. Ann., ch. 750 §
316(1) [hereinafterMichiganCode];West Virginia, W.V. Stat., ch. 61 § 61-2-1 (2000) [hereinafter W. V.
Code] and Vermont, Vt. Stat. Ann. § 2301 (2000) [hereinafter V.S.A.].
87
See e.g. Hi. Stat., tit. 37 § 707.701(l)(d) [hereinafter Hawaii Code].
88 See e.g. Hawaii Code, ibid. at § 707.701(b); Iowa Code, supra note 86, § 707.2(4); Michigan
Code, supra note 86, § 316(2)(c); Minnesota Criminal Code, ch. 609 § 105(4)(1999)[hcreinafter
Minnesota Code];and General Laws of Rhode Island, tit.1 I § 11-23-1 (2000) [hereinafter R.I. Gen.
Laws]. Note that the Canadian provision covers only police officers, peace officers, prison guards, and
other such persons, whereas in the United States it is common to see reference to the killing ofjudges,
prospective witnesses, and others in the criminal justice system.
89 See e.g. Iowa Code, supra note 86, § 707.2(2); Mass. Ann. Laws., supra note 86, ch. 265 § 1;
MichiganCode,supranote 86, § 316(1)(b); MinnesotaCode, ibid., § 609.185(3); North Dakota Century
Code, tit. 12 §12.1-16-01.l.c (2000) [hereinafter N.D. Code]; I.L
Gen. Laws, ibid.; W. V Code, supra
note 86, § 61-2-1; VS.A., supra note 86, §2301. In Canada, there is the two- stage process where there
must be proof of an intentional or reckless killing before section 231(5) comes into play. That section
makes murders during the commission of other offences first-degree. Sexual assault is the most
commonly listed offence found in most U.S. states as well as in section 231(5).
90 See e.g. Hawaii Code, supra note 87, § 707.701 (a).
See e.g. Michigan Code, supra note 86, § 316(1) and VS.A.,supra note 86, § 2301.
92 See e.g. Hawaii Code, supra note 87, § 707.701(c).
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Of the states with some form of felony murder, there is usually a
wider range of offences than those found in section 231(5) of the Code.
Most U.S. versions of felony murder include robbery and burglary, which
are not found in section 231(5).

The killing of a child is occasionally mentioned as a factor leading

to a first-degree murder conviction.93 For example, in Alaska, the firstdegree category focuses largely on children. Thus, the killing of a child after
inflicting serious physical injury by at least two separate acts, and the killing
of a child during a sexual assault constitute first-degree murder!' One
difference between the two countries is the focus on premeditation as the
foundational criteria in Canada. While several states list this as a factor, it
is more common to see an emphasis on either interference with the justice
system (killing witnesses, police officers, or prison officials), or killing
during other serious offences as the core criteria. Thus, in the United
States the focus is on the circumstances of the killing rather than on the
killer's mental state.
There is less similarity between the countries when one considers

the punishments applied in the non-death penalty states. A range of
punishments is found in the non-death penalty U.S. states!' Some states
provide for a life sentenc6 without parole for first-degree murder," and in

93

See ag. AlaskaStat. tit. 11 § 11.41.100(a)(2)(3) (2000) [hereinafterA Wsta Co;el; IoG-Co*e,

supra note 86, § 707.2(5) and Minnesota Code, supra note S3,§ 609.185(5).
94
Alaska Code, ibid., §1 1.41.100(a)(2)(3).
95

Mostof the statutes are specificabout how many ears mustbe erved before parole eligibility.
Some, however, require further inquiries into parole and other legislation vwhich is beyond the ECOp
of this article.
96 Hawaii has life without parole, however the judge must submit an application to the
governor
to commute the sentence to life with parole, unless the offender is a repeat offender. (HawaiCoJe,
supra note 87, § 706-656). Havaii also has the possibility of life without parole for cecond-degree
murder, but only if the killing was "heinous, atrocious, or cruel, manifesting exceptional depraity,"
or if there is a previous conviction for murder (Ibd., § 706-657). The Iow;a CWle provides for a
sentence for the accused's natural life, unless it is commuted by the governor (supra note C6, § M2.1).
North Dakota also haslifemithout parole for aclass AA felony, but nonethels the offender eligible
for parole after thirty years (N.D.Code, supra note 89, § 111-32-01 (1)). RL Ge. Ui ;s,supranote
88, § 11-23-2, and TVV Code, supra note 86, § 62-3-15, have dietionary life without parole
ma.dmums for first-degree murder. The District of Columbia provides for life without parole in a
separate hearing if the prosecution proves beyond a reasonable doubt anyof the aggravating factors.
The wording of the legislation is such that the sentence of life without parole is discretionay, even if
the State does so prove. The aggravating factors are similar to those rendering murder as first-degree
inother statutes, however there are one or two categoriesworthy ofnote:w;here the murderwvas bazed
on the victim's race, colour, religion, national origin, or ze'ual orientation, and where the %timrwas
especially vulnerable due to age or a mental or physical disability.
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one state, even for second-degree murder.97 Life without parole is almost
always a discretionary sentence in these states. However, "life without
parole" does not necessarily mean life without parole. North Dakota, for
example, allows an accused sentenced to life without parole to apply for
parole after thirty years of imprisonment. The period which the accused
must serve for first-degree murder or the equivalent ranges from fifteen
years98 to ninety-nine years. 99
There is also a wide range of sentences for second-degree murder
in these states. There appears to be more discretion for second-degree
murder, with the sentences ranging from a minimum of ten years before
parolelo to the potential of life without parole. t ' Most of these
jurisdictions do have a mandatory minimum sentence for second-degree
murder.
2.

Death penalty states

The analysis in this section focuses on four states, New York and
California, which were chosen for their size, and Texas and Florida, which
were selected for their high rates of execution.
In none of these states is the death penalty mandatory, nor does any
state make the death penalty available for all murders. In California, firstdegree murder is punishable by death, imprisonment for life (without
parole), or imprisonment for a period from twenty-five years to life."2 In
New York, first-degree murder is punishable by death, imprisonment for
life without parole, or life imprisonment with a period of parole ineligibility

97

Hawaii Code, supranote 87, § 706-656; Alaska has a maximum ninety-nine years for
second.
degree murder (Alaska Code, supra note 93, §12.55.125(3)(a), (2)(b)).
98
R.L Gen.Laws, supranote 88, §11-23-2.2. In West Virginia, a jury recommendation of mcrcy,
or a guilty plea, can prevent life without parole and allow eligibility for parole consideration after a
minimum of fifteen years (W. VCode, supra note 86, § 62-3-15).
99 In Alaska, if the victim is a peace officer, firefighter, or correctional employee, if there
is a
previous conviction for murder, or if there is physical torture, the accused must be sentenced to ninety-

nine years. (Alaska Code, supra note 88, §12.55.125(a)).
1 00

R.J Gen. Laws, supra note 88, § 11-23-2, andAlaska Code, supra note 93, § 12.55.125(3)(b).
101 In Hawaii, where the killing was particularly cruel or atrocious, or where there was a previous
conviction for murder. See supra note 91.
102 Cal. Stat. Ann. tit. 8 § 190 (2000) [hereinafter CaliforniaCodel.
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of twenty to twenty-five years." 3 In Texas and Florida, first-degree murder
is punishable by either death or life imprisonment without parole.'
While each state differs in the procedures to be applied, the
essential similarity is that the jury weighs aggravating and mitigating factors
to determine whether death should be imposed. In Texas, California, and
New York, the decision as to whether death should be imposed is made by
the jury. In Florida, the jury makes a recommendation to the judge, and the
final decision lies with the judge.
In each of these states there is a bifurcated system; that is, the
decision about guilt for first-degree murder is made first. Once that
decision has been made, a hearing will take place and the jury ,,l then be
asked to weigh aggravating and mitigating factors to determine what
sentence should be imposed. In New York, the aggravating factors are the
same as those that elevate murder to first-degree, but there is a statutory
list of mitigating factors. In Texas, the jury is first asked whether the
accused would be a continuing threat to society and, if convicted as a party
to murder, whether the accused caused the death or intended to cause the
death. If these questions are answered in the affirmative, then the jury is
told to determine whether there are sufficient mitigating circumstances that
warrant the imposition of a life sentence instead of the death penalty. The
jury is unfettered in deciding what factors to consider. In California and
Florida, there is a list of aggravating and mitigating factors. In both of these
states, and in New York, the mitigating factors include those personal to
the accused such as mental disability, age, duress, and emotional distress.
Lists of aggravating factors tend to look more at the details of the crime
and the identity of the victim.
3.

Discussion

What can we learn from the various sentencing regimes in the
United States? With respect to degrees of murder, there are more
similarities with Canada than differences. All the criteria that make murder
first-degree in Canada are consistently found in the U.S. jurisdictions which
rely on degrees of murder. However, the United States does demonstrate
that there is potentially a much wider range of factors that make murders
particularly heinous. U.S. states consistently consider factors such as
multiple murders and murders with particular brutality.

103 N.Y Penal Law § 70.00 (McKinney 1993).
104

Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.31 (West 1989). and Fla. Stat. Ann. § 775.032 (West 1992).
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How do penalties for murder in non-death penalty states compare
with the penalties in Canada? Obviously, life without parole is more
extreme than any punishment found in Canada. One can see legislative
attempts in these states to have it both ways, labeling a sentence as life
without parole, and yet providing for parole. As for the other U.S.
jurisdictions, the parole ineligibility period in Canada for first-degree
murder seems to lie somewhere in the middle of U.S. provisions. The U.S.
penalty regimes are sufficiently diverse, and exist in the context of a country
where most states have the death penalty. Even the non-death penalty
states must be influenced by that fact.
The most notable feature of the death penalty states is the
important role given to the jury in making the decision as to whether death
should be imposed. While in some states the jury's discretion is fettered by
specific factors, in Texas, the jury is essentially free to consider all factors
relating to the crime. In a related vein, the system is a bifurcated one. The
decision is first made about the accused's guilt for murder, either firstdegree or capital, and then the decision is made as to whether the death
penalty should be imposed. This is done so that at the sentencing stage
there can be a full and open hearing, without concerns about prejudice
which might exist if such evidence were heard at trial. There is surprising
consistency in the criteria justifying the imposition of the harshest penalty
known to law. These include murder for hire, multiple murders, murders
during the commission of other serious crimes, repeat murders, and
murders involving torture or particular brutality to the victim.
B.

England

One might expect that the English sentencing regime would have
more in common with Canada than does the U.S. regime. To the contrary,
the English sentencing regime for murder is the most unusual of the
jurisdictions examined here.
Prior to 1957, all murders in England were punishable by death,
unless the offender was a pregnant woman or a person under eighteen
when the offence was committed. 105 In 1957, England adopted a system of
capital and non-capital murder. Murders of police officers or prison
officials, murders in the course of a theft, murders by shooting or causing
an explosion, or murders in the course of resisting arrest, were capital

105 See J.C. Smith, "The Penalty for Murder" (1988) 19 Cambrian L Rev. 5.
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murders. ' This classification system lasted only eight years. In 1965, the
death penalty was abolished altogether, and replaced with a mandatory
sentence of life imprisonment, except for those under eighteen at the time
of the offence. The prescribed life sentence for murder in England is
unique in that the period of imprisonment to be served by a convicted
murderer before parole is not determined by a court of law, but by a
cabinet minister, the Home Secretary. Murder is the only crime for which
courts are afforded no discretion in sentencing.' 3
Since 1983, the mandatory life sentence for murder has consisted
of three phases. The first, referred to as the "tariff," is a period of
incarceration to mark retribution and deterrence. The second is a period
of imprisonment which lasts as long as the prisoner is perceived to be a risk
to the community. The third is a period of release of the offender on
license which is subject to recall for the rest of the offender's life, similar to
an offender being on parole for a life sentence in Canada. The power of
recall is apparently used frequently and sometimes the offender may be
recalled and released more than once.
Upon a conviction for murder, the trial judge is bound by statute to
impose a sentence of life imprisonment. ' Although the trial judge is given
no discretion in sentencing, the judge is authorized to give a
recommendation on the minimum period which should be served before
the Home Secretary orders the release of the offender.' 0 The trial judge
submits a view of the appropriate tariff to the Home Secretary by way of
the office of the Lord Chief Justice, who also submits an opinion on the
matter. While the judicial advice is influential, it is not binding. The Home
Secretary is free to vary the tariff period in making the final decision.
Since the House of Lords ruling in R. v. Secretary of State for the
Home Department exparte Smart PeggDoody and Pierson,"' the power of
the Home Secretary to set tariffs which are vastly different from those
recommended by the trial judge and the Lord Chief Justice has been
fettered. The Home Secretary is now required to inform the offenderof the

106 HomicideAct, 1957 (U.K.), 1957,c. I I,
ss. 5-7.
10 7 Afurder (AbolitionoftieDeath Penalv,)Act 1965 (U.I.), 1965.c. 71,s. 2 [hereinafter Murder

(Abolition of Death Penalt)Act].Those who are under the age of eighteen at the time of the Offencc
are sentenced to mandatory detention at Her Majestys pleasure.
10 Smith, supra note 105.
109 Murder(Abolitionof Death Penaty)Act,supra note 107, s. 1
(1).

Ibid.,s. 1(2).
[19931 3 W.LR. 154.
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tariff period recommended by the judiciary. The offender must be given an
opportunity to make representations in writing as to the appropriate tariff.
In addition, the Home Secretary is now obliged to give reasons for
departing from the judicial recommendation, and the Home Secretary's
decision may be open to challenge by way of judicial review. While the
Home Secretary may ask the Parole Board for advice, he or she is not
bound by that advice.
Once the tariff has been served, the Home Secretary retains the
discretion to release the life prisoner on license. Thus, the Home Secretary
maintains the ultimate power to determine both the appropriate tariff-the
minimum period of incarceration-and the date of release.
Both the mandatory life sentence for murder and the role of the
Home Secretary in sentencing convicted murderers have been widely
criticized.' 12 The role of the Home Secretary is criticized for bringing a
political component into sentencing for murder that does not exist for any
other crime. Reforms for "discretionary lifers," as they are called, have
been called for repeatedly by members of the House of Lords, but blocked
by the political process:
The existence of the mandatory life sentence for murder, and the decision-making
structures which flow from it, quite clearly have a political rather than a jurisprudential
basis. Its rationale has been exposed as confused and contradictory by the courts. The senior
judiciary has argued that there is no legitimate philosophical basis for a mandatory sentence
for murder, since the offence itself varies so greatly."3

J.C. Smith has noted how ill-placed the Home Secretary is to set the
tariff compared to the trial judge. The trial judge has heard the evidence,
seen the witnesses and the accused, and heard arguments relating to
mitigating factors. 14 Perhaps the most influential criticism has been that of
the European Court of Human Rights. In hearing the appeal of two tenyear old boys convicted of the brutal murder of two-year old James Bulger,
the Court ruled that the intervention by the then Home Secretary, Michael
Howard, was a violation of their human rights. The two boys were
sentenced to serve a minimum of fifteen years in prison by the Home
Secretary. The trial judge had originally recommended a minimum of eight
years, which was raised to ten years by the Lord Chief Justice. While the
European Court could not overturn the boys' convictions nor order their

112 See Smith, supra note 105.

113 Justice Society, Sentencedfor Life (London: Justice, 1996) at 35-36.
114 Smith, supra note 105 at 10.
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release, the British government is obligated to reform those sentencing
practices deemed by the Court to be in breach of the European Convention
on Human Rights.
The British government has responded to the European Court
ruling, removing the Home Secretary's power to decide the tariff for child
murderers. However, the tariff period is still determined by the Home
Secretary for adult murderers.
C.

Australia

Australia is the only jurisdiction under review which has
experimented with more lenient sentences for murder. The definitions of
murder in the various Australian states are similar to the Canadian
definitions before the Supreme Court invalidated the various forms of
constructive murder. Comparisons of the sentences between the two
jurisdictions must be made in light of this difference. The broader
definitions in Australia should support more lenient sentences because
more offenders are swept into the category of murder.
Unlike in Canada, most Australian states do not distinguish among
degrees of murder. While most of the states examined have similar
definitions of murder, there is more variation in punishments. Western
Australia, Queensland, and the Northern Territory all impose a mandatory
life sentence for murder. However, the period that an offender will actually
spend incarcerated differs among jurisdictions.
Tasmania, New South Wales, and Victoria all provide for a
maximum sentence of life, but none of these states prescribes a minimum
sentence or period of parole ineligibility. Victoria and Tasmania appear to
be the most flexible, with both jurisdictions providing for a maximum
penalty of life imprisonment. Neither jurisdiction prescribes a
corresponding maximum or minimum period of parole ineligibility.
In New South Wales, the mandatory life sentence for murder was
abolished in 1983. This change followed the Report of the Task Force on
Domestic Violence," 5 which expressed the view that life imprisonment was
too harsh a punishment for women who killed abusive spouses." 6 Life
imprisonment remained the starting point for sentencing, but ajudge could

115G.D.Woods, Report of the Task Force on Domestic

7olence, (Sydney: New South NValec
Premier's Department, 1981).
116 See G.D. Woods, "The Sanctity of Murder: Reforming the Homicide Penalty in New, Sluth
Wales" (1983) 57 Australian LJ. 161 at 161.
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impose less than a life sentence where it appeared "that the person's
culpability for the crime is significantly diminished by mitigating
circumstances.""' 7 In other words, life was to be the norm unless mitigating
circumstances were established. The 1990's saw increased public demands
for honesty in sentencing, particularly for violent criminals. Hence in 1990,
the meaning of "life imprisonment" was revised, so that offenders
sentenced to "life" for murder would actually spend the rest of their lives
in prison." 8 Most recently, the Crimes (SentencingProcedure)Act, 1999. 9
has changed the starting point by providing that life sentences should only
be given where the goals of sentencing require it:
A court is to impose a sentence of imprisonment for life on a person who is convicted of

murder if the court is satisfied that the level of culpability in the commission of the offence
protection
is so extreme that the community interest in retribution, punishment, community
1
and deterrence can only be met through the imposition of that sentence. 2

Section 61 of the Crimes (SentencingProcedure)Act implies that life
imprisonment is to be reserved for the most serious murders, where no
other sentence will meet the stated goals. Section 21(1) further provides
that where life is the maximum sentence, a court may impose a specified
period of years, thus indicating that a life sentence is not mandatory.
However, where life is given, courts have no statutory authority to set a
period after which the accused is eligible for parole.
A brief review of the case law suggests that even for murder, life
sentences are not meted out very often. In the 2000 decision in R. v.
Valera,'2 ' the Court indicated that since "life means life" was enacted in
1990, only sixteen life sentences had been handed down for murder (plus
the one in Valera itself). Courts have interpreted the legislation to mean
that life imprisonment must be reserved for the worst category of murders
only.

122

With regard to whether a case falls in the worst category, the Court
held that this test did not mean that a lesser penalty had to be given if one

117 Crimes (Homicide)Amendment Act 1982 (Aust.), 1982, No. 24
(NSW), s.19.
118 CrimesAct 1990 (Aust.), 1990 (NSW), s. 19A (which replaced s. 19, ibid.).
119 Crimes (Sentencing Procedures) Act, 1999 (Aust.), 1999, No. 92 (NSW).
120Ibid., s. 61(1).
121 [20001 N.S.W. S.C. 1220 [hereinafter Valera].
122 See R. v. Georgiou, [2000] N.S.W. S.C. 287.
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could imagine a more heinous case. "A life sentence offends this principle
only if the case is recognizably outside the category."'
In Valera, for example, the two killings were random and revealed
horrendous brutality. The first victim was decapitated and his body
seriously mutilated after death. The judge noted that the accused was only
nineteen years old at the time of the murders and had no criminal record.
Nonetheless, the heinous nature of the killings justified the imposition of
a life sentence.
In order to fall within the worst category of eases, it is not necessary
that the murder be planned and deliberate 4 nor is this category limited to
accuseds who are likely to remain a continuing danger to society."
Multiple murders may support a life sentence,'2 but will not in themselves
be a sufficient justification for imposing life.'2 7
The "worst category" of cases is not a very helpful test for
determining who will get a life sentence and who Will not. The application
of the test turns on an evaluation of which murders are worse than others.
This evaluation is clearly normative, and one about which there might be
significant disagreement among reasonable people. In New South Vales,
the murders that fit into this category seem to be the random ones, stranger
killings, particularly those involving mutilationi or pain and degradation
for the victim. 2 9
Neither Victoria nor Tasmania have mandatory life sentences for
murder, nor mandatory periods of parole ineligibility. Furthermore, in
these jurisdictions, life imprisonment does not necessarily mean that an
offender will spend the rest of his or her life incarcerated. Notwithstanding
this difference from New South Wales, life sentences do not appear to be
commonly imposed for murder in these jurisdictions either. In both
jurisdictions, since 1997, sentences most often range from twelve to twentyfive years, with periods of parole ineligibility from eight to nineteen years.
One can see that even where a life sentence is not mandatory, reasonably

1

23 Ibid. at para. 106.
124 Ibid.
1

25 bid.

126

Valera,supranote 121.

12 7

Georgiou, supra note 122. Where there ':ere three victims Ullcd and another injured in a

motorcycle gang dispute, the Court nonetheless found the caxe did not v.arrant life impriwnment,
128R.v. Femando(1997), 95 A Crim R 533.
129 R %.Garforth (21 May 1994). (N.S.W.C. CA) [unreported).
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long periods of imprisonment are imposed for murder in these
jurisdictions.
The brief review of these jurisdictions demonstrates that there are
few innovative sentencing regimes for the crime of murder that might
provide guidance or direction for reform in Canada. The Australian
jurisdictions which have abolished mandatory life imprisonment,
particularly New South Wales, are the most revealing for the purposes of
this article. New South Wales demonstrates that where mandatory life
sentences have been abolished, life sentences are reserved for the most
heinous and brutal cases. However, the sparse use of a life sentence in New
South Wales must be viewed in the context of legislative reform, which
makes a life sentence mean life imprisonment. This makes it particularly
difficult to draw generalizations from that jurisdiction to our own, where a
life sentence can mean as little as seven-years imprisonment. Nonetheless,
the experience in these jurisdictions with discretionary life sentences
suggests that, should Canada adopt such a regime, we might still have
difficulties in determining which murders are most deserving of a life
sentence.
VIII. REFORMING SENTENCING FOR MURDER IN CANADA
Several issues arise from our existing regime and from the above
discussion of alternate regimes. First, do we need degrees of murder to
identify which murders are most heinous? Second, should we retain periods
of parole ineligibility for murder? Third, should we maintain a mandatory
life sentence for all murders?
A.

Degreesof Murder

The distinction between first-and second-degree murder should be
abolished. Degrees of murder are most frequently used in the United
States, even in states which currently do not have the death penalty. The
distinction may be useful in jurisdictions where the death penalty is applied
to some murders and not to others, although there are problems with its
use even in that context. Even in death penalty states in the United States
that distinguish between first-degree or capital murder and second-degree
or non-capital murder, there is a recognition that the distinctions are not
in themselves adequate for determining who should die. After a finding of
capital murder is made, juries are given the opportunity to consider
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mitigating factors. " In Australia and England, where the death penalty has
been abolished, degrees of murder have been almost entirely rejected.
England experimented with degrees of murder after limiting the death
penalty to certain murders in 1957.111 The degree regime lasted only eight
years, and was subject to criticism. Smith provides the following example:
Any attempt to single out particular factors as meriting capital punishment and include
them in a statutory definition is, in my opinion, doomed to failure. Consider the factors of
poison, deliberation and pre-mediation mentioned in the Penn7,lania statute [the first
statute to use degrees of murder]. All these may be present in the caze of the zo-called
mercy-killer, e.g. the mother who, after long and hard thought, gxe.s her incuraby oil and
suffering child an overdose of sleeping pills. No one. I imagine, would rash to hang her. t "

The same can be said about trying to distinguish between murders
which deserve t-wenty-five years of parole ineligibility and those deserving
ten years. It is not alvays possible to decide which killings are more
heinous, nor is it necessary to have that distinction carved in stone
legislatively.
Degrees of murder can also result in overcharging, or in pressuring
accused persons into plea agreements to avoid the harsh penalties for firstdegree murder. A charge of first-degree murder could induce a guilty plea
to second-degree murder, or even manslaughter, in the interests of avoiding
the mandatory penalty. It may be a particular problem in the context of
women who kill abusive partners.13 3 While such women may have a defence
of self-defence or even duress, the literature suggests that such defences are
often difficult to establish.
Harsh mandatory sentences shift some of the sentencing power
from the judge to the police and prosecutors, who decide which charges are
laid. While we may not fully trust judges to impose appropriate sentences,
at least judges' decisions are subject to public scrutiny. The same is not true
of prosecutorial decisions regarding charge selection.

130 See ag.CaliforniaCode, supra note 102, §1901.L
131 HomnicideAct, supra note 106, ss. 5-7.
132 Smith, supra note 105 at 6.
133 Canada, The Self-Defence Review Oveniewand ,cat Steps (Ottata Gas eminent of Canada,
September 1997).
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ParoleIneligibility

The harsh periods of parole ineligibility attached to a murder
sentence should also be abolished. According to a brief submitted to the
Department of Justice by the Elizabeth Fry Society, Canada is second only
to the United States in terms of the average length of time served for firstdegree murder (28.4 years). 34 England and Australia have much lower
averages, at 14.4 and 14.75 years respectively.135 While I am not suggesting
that short sentences are necessarily always better, if we are eventually going
to release most offenders, we need to examine the peneological purposes
of keeping murderers in jail for a quarter of a century.
What would happen if the existing periods of parole ineligibility for
murder were abolished? If the life sentence is retained in Canada, this
would not mean that a convicted murderer would spend the rest of his or
her life in prison. The Correctionsand ConditionalReleaseAct'36 provides
that an offender sentenced to life is eligible for parole after seven years. Of
course, this does not mean that the offender will be paroled after seven
years, but rather, it simply provides the opportunity to apply for parole.
Furthermore, once paroled, a life sentence means that the offender is
permanently subject to re-imprisonment for breach of parole conditions.
For most offences, the CorrectionsAct allows for parole eligibility
after the offender has served one-third of his or her sentence. Section 743.6
of the Code, however, gives the sentencing judge the discretion to increase
the period before parole eligibility from the usual one-third to one-half the
sentence imposed (or ten years, whichever is less).1 37 This applies to a
scheduled list of offences including attempted murder and manslaughter.
Currently, murder is not one of the scheduled offences because it has its
own stringent periods of parole ineligibility. If those periods were repealed,
one option would be to add murder to the schedule of offences covered by
section 743.6, thus providing for parole ineligibility for up to ten years,
depending on the sentence imposed. While I am not generally in favour of
increasing the periods of parole ineligibility for murder, it might appear
incongruous if offences less serious than murder were included in section

134 Response to the Department of Justice re: Reforming the Criminal Code Defences:
Provocation,Self-Defence andDefence of Property,online: The Canadian Association of Elizabeth Fry
Societies <http:llwww.elizabethfry.calResponse/15.htm> (date accessed: 13 February 2000) at 15.
135 Ibid.
136 S.C. 1992, c. 20, s.120. [hereinafter CorrectionsAct].
137 Code, supra note 4, s. 743.6.
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743.6 and murder was not. The question would then be whether any murder
would require a sentence harsher than life with ten years of parole
ineligibility.
C.

Life Sentences: Mandatory orDiscretionary

The most difficult issue in sentencing for murder is whether or not
the life sentence should be retained. Most observers would agree that the
maximum penalty for murder should be life imprisonment. The more
difficult question is whether life imprisonment should be mandatory for all
murders.
Many jurisdictions have struggled with this question.' Jurisdictions
which abolish the death penalty tend to replace it with mandatory life
imprisonment. After experience with mandatory life sentences, some
Australian states have moved to a discretionary life sentence.'" The trend
in the United States, however, has been towards more rigid penalties for
murder, with life without parole and the death penalty being utilized more
frequently.
There are at least three options for dealing with the life sentence.
First, we could retain the e-sting regime, where life imprisonment is
mandatory for all murders. Second, we could abolish the mandatory life
sentence, leaving life as the maximum sentence. This would make the
sentencing regime for murder identical to that for attempted murder and
manslaughter. Third, we could develop a regime in which life imprisonment
is the norm for most murders, but provision is made for an exemption from
the mandatory penalty in cases where a life sentence would result in a
miscarriage of justice. The following sections will examine each of these
options.

138 See e-g. Australia, Law Reform Commissioner of Victona., Murder.Mental Eemcnt an,
Punishment (Working Paper No. 9) (Melbourne: The Commissioner, 1934). Butler Committce on
Mental Abnormal Offenders, Cmnd. 6244, 1975; U.K., Report of the Advi-Jwr Council on the Penal
System,Senencesoflmprisonment:ARev:e ofMrva.numuPcnalitcs(London Her Majesty*"stattanar*
Office, 1978); and New Zealand, Criminal Law, Reform Committee, Report an udtpat!e Honuetde,
(Wellington: Criminal Law Reform Committee, 1976).

139 New South Wales moxed first from the death cnalty. to a mw
to a discretionary life sentence wvhere a judge may impose any term I

-ntenea, and then
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Retain mandatory life sentences

Those in favour of a mandatory life sentence point to the important
denunciatory function that the penalty serves. The mandatory life sentence
makes a strong statement that all murders, regardless of the circumstances,
involve the intentional or reckless taking of a human life, and anything less
than a mandatory life sentence does not adequately reflect the gravity of
the crime. The taking of a life should consistently be met with our most
serious sentence. It also provides for a degree of certainty both in terms of
deterrence and for the families of murder victims. This view is based on the
idea that murder is a unique crime, deserving of a uniquely harsh sentence.
Further, if the life sentence is mandatory, one avoids the difficulties
inherent in making distinctions between the taking of one life versus the
taking of another.
However, the notion of one sentence for.all murders fails to take
into account that murders fall along a spectrum of moral culpability. While
there are the Bernardos and the Olsons on one end of the continuum, and
true mercy killers on the other, the vast majority of murderers lie
somewhere between these two extremes. Both these extremes, in other
words, are anomalies. A mandatory life sentence fails to acknowledge any
range of culpability for different murders. The rigidity of the life sentence,
and the corresponding inability to respond to the varying circumstances of
murder, lead me to reject this option.
2.

Discretionary life sentences

The second option is to retain life as the maximum sentence for
murder, but to make it discretionary. Having life as a maximum, but not
minimum sentence, assumes that murders differ in culpability. It provides
judges with discretion to take into account the mitigating and aggravating
circumstances in each case.
Underlying this option is the view that murder is not unique when
compared to, for example, attempted murder and manslaughter. Both of
these offences have a maximum life sentence with no mandatory minimum.
How unique is murder? In terms of moral culpability, murder may be closer
in culpability to attempted murder than to manslaughter. In fact, the mens
rea for some attempted murders is more blameworthy than for murder.
Whether an attempted murder becomes a murder may depend on the
quality of medical care available, the pre-existing health of the victim, or
even the accused's competence with firearms. Of course, this fails to take
into account the central difference between murder and attempted murder,
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that is, the causing of death. The punishment for murder must take that
central fact into account.
Manslaughter shares with murder the causing of death, but it lacks
the same degree of moral culpability. Both manslaughter and attempted
murder have maximum life sentences, but the trial judge has the discretion
to set the appropriate sentence up to and including life. Life imprisonment
is reserved for the worst manslaughters and the worst attempted murders.
Our sentencing regime for murder abandons this principle, perhaps on the
implicit premise that all murders are the worst offence.
One advantage of this option is that if we reject the mandatory
penalties for murder, we could also abandon some of the defences which
have evolved to get around the harshness of sentencing for murder.
Provocation is the most obvious example. Removing mandatory minimum
sentences would enable judges to consider relevant factors at sentencing.
Similarly, the informal defence of diminished responsibility, where judges
use mental illness, short of that required for a mental disorder defence, to
reduce murder to manslaughter would no longer be necessary. Arguably
also, intoxication could be taken into account at sentencing, and not at the
liability stage of a trial. Finally, the offence of infanticide, which some say
was developed because juries refused to convict of murder women who
killed their newly born children, could be abolished if sentencing for
murder were sufficiently flexible.
While this option has obvious advantages, it also has potential
problems. Should the sentence for murder be identical to that for
manslaughter and attempted murder? Sentencing for each of these offences
should take into account, among other things, whether the intent to take a
life was present, and whether or not a life was taken. Only murder satisfies
both these criteria. Attempted murder and manslaughter each has only one
of these elements. If we have rejected the mandatory parole ineligibility
periods, there is little left to differentiate the offences.
Currently, manslaughter and attempted murder need not result in
a custodial sentence. 40 If the mandatory life sentence were repealed, it
would be necessary to decide whether it should ever be possible to receive
a suspended sentence with probation for murder. Would a non-custodial
sentence ever be an adequate reflection of society's outrage at the
intentional or reckless taking of a human life? If we wanted to avoid noncustodial sentences, it would be necessary to set a minimum penalty of

J40 Attempted murder has a mandatory minimum sentence of four-ears imprionlment %,,hre
a firearm is used in the commission of the offence,
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some term of imprisonment. We would once again be faced with the
difficulties of setting one minimum penalty for an offence with such a wide
range of culpability.
However, even with the relatively low parole ineligibility period
attached to life imprisonment, if life sentences were made discretionary, it
is still likely that life imprisonment would be reserved for the most serious
cases. The impact of this change might then be to push manslaughter and
attempted murder sentences down, so as to maintain a distinction in
culpability among the three offences. While this result is not necessarily
bad, it is something we should do carefully and deliberately. Similarly, plea
negotiations may be more difficult where all three offences have the same
sentence.
It has been argued that it is necessary to abolish the mandatory life
sentence for murder in order to treat fairly women accused of killing their
abusive spouses. Women who kill abusive spouses in fear for their own lives
should not end up with mandatory life sentences and harsh periods of
parole ineligibility. However, in my view, the problem here lies primarily in
our formulation of self-defence, in prosecutorial decisions about what
charge to lay, and in plea negotiations. A woman who kills in fear for her
life, after repeated physical violence, should be acquitted on the basis of a
proper understanding of our law of self-defence. Furthermore, Crown
prosecutors should be educated about the proper charge selection where
a woman has been the victim of persistent abuse. Finally, it is necessary to
ensure that such women are given competent legal counsel and are not
coerced into plea agreements to avoid the harsh reality of a murder
conviction. In my view, abolition of the periods of parole ineligibility will
go a long way towards dealing with the plea negotiation problem in these
cases. Women may be pleading guilty to manslaughter or even seconddegree murder because of their fear of the harsh parole ineligibility periods
associated with murder and, especially first-degree murder. Once these
have been abolished along with degrees of murder, as recommended above,
the pressure to enter into plea agreements when the woman has a
legitimate defence, will significantly decrease.
Despite these considerations, it is still true that some female
offenders will be advantaged by abolishing mandatory minimum life
sentences. But it is equally true that women are more often victims of
murder, after years of domestic abuse, than they are the killers of their
abusive husbands. I acknowledge that treating their killers harshly may in
fact do nothing to protect women in violent relationships. Men rarely
contemplate the differences between murder and manslaughter when
assaulting their spouses. But it is important, when domestic abuse escalates
to murder, that it be considered very serious on the spectrum of murders.
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In The Law of Homicide, 4 ' I suggested that the life sentence for
murder be retained. This view was criticized, 4 2and this criticism led me to
re-think the issue. I started this article in order to argue for the abolition of
the mandatory life sentence, and in favour of full discretion for the trial
judge. However, in writing this article, I am still not convinced that this is
the best option at the present time in history. On the one hand, retaining
the mandatory life sentence has the possibility of imposing life
imprisonment in the few cases where it is too harsh. On the other hand,
giving trial judges absolute discretion risks trivializing some murders and
treating them on par with attempted murder (in which no life is taken) and
manslaughter (in which a life is taken unintentionally).
After struggling with this issue, I have concluded that the majority
of murders deserve a life sentence, with its seven-year parole ineligibility
period assuming that the firstfsecond-degree classification is abandoned
and that the harsh periods of parole ineligibility are abolished. However,
I now believe it is important for the law to recognize that there will be cases
where a life sentence with its seven years of parole ineligibility will be too
harsh. The question then is whether the law should start from the position
of a life sentence where exceptions from that have to be justified or
whether life sentences should be the exception and not the rule. While I
have not fully resolved this question in my own mind, the following presents
one possible compromise between maintaining the existing regime and
abolishing the mandatory life sentence altogether.
3.

A compromise

In my view, some sort of compromise is necessary between always
imposing a life sentence for murder and giving trial judges complete
discretion; a compromise that will recognize the unique seriousness of
murder on the one hand, and yet allow for flexdbility on the other. One such
compromise might be to impose a life sentence (with its corresponding
seven-years parole ineligibility) as the starting point for murder, and to
provide a mechanism for departing from that norm in cases where a life
sentence would constitute a miscarriage of justice. This would be a
statutory exemption, and not a constitutional one. It would require
sentencing judges, before imposing a sentence for murder, to consider

141 Homicide,supra, note S at 7-S2 -7-83.
142 See, for example, P. MacKinnon,"Reflection5 on Homcde" f19951 6 Cnm L Forum 315;
and H.A. Kaiser, "A Confluence of Authority and Critique" (1996) 19 Dal LJ 193.
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whether or not a life sentence would constitute a miscarriage of justice in
the circumstances of a case.
There are different variations on the exemption idea. It could be
based on a recommendation from the jury or entirely within the discretion
of the trial judge. In my view, this function is more appropriately a judicial
one, as is the rest of sentencing. There should be no burden of proof on the
accused to establish that a miscarriage ofjustice would result. This decision
should be made at the discretion of the court, on consideration of all the
evidence before it, submissions from both parties, a pre-sentencing report,
and a victim impact statement.
This option does have the advantage of retaining some difference
between the sentence for murder and that for manslaughter, without the
rigidity of our existing regime. The starting point would be a life sentence
for murder, but a means for departing from that starting point would be
available, without resort to a constitutional exemption. The seriousness of
murder could be recognized, without the rigidity of the existing regime.
What would a life sentence look like under this option? First,
because the mandatory parole ineligibility periods would be abolished, the
life sentence would have a parole ineligibility period of seven years. It
would be possible to add murder to section 743.6, which would enable the
trial judge to impose a period of parole ineligibility of up to ten years.143
There are two further questions that would need to be addressed.
First, in cases where a life sentence is departed from, should there be any
minimum sentence? Second, are there any circumstances where a life
sentence with a parole ineligibility period increased to ten years (assuming
murder was added to section 743.6) would be inadequate? I argue that
there should be no minimum sentence. Cases where life imprisonment is
being departed from will likely be exceptional and will likely have
unpredictable circumstances. Judges need an unfettered discretion to deal
with such unusual circumstances.
The second question asks whether the maximum period of parole
ineligibility should ever be raised above ten years. Do we ever need more
than life imprisonment with no parole for ten years in order to adequately
reflect society's denunciation? It is important here to distinguish between
parole ineligibility and release. A period of ten years before being eligible
for parole by no means guarantees the offender's release after ten years.
Thus, the period of parole ineligibility is not a reflection of the appropriate
sentence for the accused. It is simply the time before which the Parole

143 See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
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Board cannot consider the offender's case. In a certain respect, it is the
denunciatory part of the sentence, that is, the part of the sentence that
reflects society's outrage at the crime. The risk-prevention part of a
sentence (i.e., the determination of whether an offender will present a risk
to society upon release) cannot be assessed by a judge years in advance.
Risk assessment is more appropriately left to the Parole Board .vhen
release is under consideration. A judge is better placed to determine the
sentence necessary to denounce the crime and seek retribution. For a crime
as serious as murder, where the sentence is likely to be a long one, a judge's
role should end there.
The question should be whether a life sentence with ten years of
parole ineligibility is sufficient for the denunciatory part of the sentence,
the expression of society's outrage, and the need for retribution. In my
view, the answer will almost always be yes. There are some murderers,
however, whose crimes are so terrible that they may deserve periods of
parole ineligibility longer than ten years for adequate denunciation. Paul
Bernardo and Clifford Olson come to mind as two obvious examples. The
multiple murders committed by each of these men and the brutality and
utter senselessness of their killings, cry out for periods of parole ineligibility
greater than ten years. There are different ways of accomplishing this goal.
First, the dangerous offender legislation could be amended to
include murder within its scope. The difficulty with this option under our
existing law would be the conflicting periods of parole ineligibility.
Currently, a dangerous offender is eligible for parole after seven years of
imprisonment. This could be changed to provide an exception for murder,
such that where the dangerous offender hearing is predicated on a murder
conviction, the parole ineligibility period available for that crime (ten years
under section 743.6) would govern in lieu of the seven years for the usual
dangerous offender. The dangerous offender designation does not
guarantee that such offenders will be incarcerated for more than ten years.
It is more of a symbolic statement to the Parole Board, regarding the
offender's dangerousness.
A second possibility would be to bypass section 743.6 for murder
altogether, and to enact a separate provision for murder such that parole
ineligibility could be raised to, for example, fifteen years, on a Crown
application. In my view, the dangers of such a mechanism outweigh its
benefits. The central danger is that it will be used too often, and that we
will continue to see sentences for murder of life imprisonment with high
periods of parole ineligibility. Unless we are going to adopt life without
parole, at a certain point we are going to have to trust our Parole Board to
keep such offenders imprisoned until they no longer present a risk to the
public. As long as our system gives the Parole Board this power, it is
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unnecessary to design our murder sentencing regime around our very
worst, and admittedly unusual, offenders. Thus, I conclude that life without
parole for seven years, which could occasionally be increased to ten years
under section 743.6, is a harsh enough maximum sentence. This maximum,
coupled with the authority resting in the trial judge to depart from the life
sentence where its imposition would result in a miscarriage of justice, is a
compromise designed to protect accused persons and victims.
IX.

CONCLUSION

This article has argued for the abolition of degrees of murder and
the harsh parole ineligibility periods under our existing regime. The former
leads to arbitrary classifications, which may not reflect the increased
culpability that goes with our most serious murders, and the latter results
in longer periods of imprisonment than may be necessary to serve
legitimate social objectives.
I have struggled with whether the mandatory life sentence should
be abolished, and instead, I recommend a compromise. I believe that for
most murders, life imprisonment and parole ineligibility for seven years is
a reasonable penalty. Having said that, I also recognize that there will be
cases where a life sentence is unjust. It is difficult, if not impossible, to set
out in advance the conditions in which injustice could result. Rather than
resorting to constitutional exemptions, I would support giving sufficient
discretion to judges, such that they could decide, in each case, whether the
life sentence would result in a miscarriage of justice. This option would
retain life imprisonment as the norm for murder without imposing a heavy
onus on an accused to depart from that norm.
I realize that some will criticize the retention of the life sentence as
the starting point for murder, even with an escape clause. However, given
that the Supreme Court of Canada has narrowed the definition of murder,
it is important for our society to make a strong denunciatory statement
about persons who intentionally or recklessly take the life of another
human being. If we are concerned about mercy killings, there is the escape
clause to deal with cases wherejustice demands lenience. Sentencing judges
are well-positioned to make assessments about which sentences require a
departure from the norm, having heard submissions from both sides. It will
thus be up to judges to determine how frequently and under what
circumstances this escape clause should be utilized. At the very least, those
circumstances should be consistent with the general principles of sentencing
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and the values reflected in section 718.2.' Thus, for example, murders
based on hate for persons of a particular race or sexual orientation, or
those committed pursuant to a pattern of spousal or child abuse, would not
normally be considered for the exemption.
I also believe that this compromise is the next logical step in the
reform of murder sentencing. In 1976, we moved away from the death
penalty to our current regime (less some minor modifications). It is now
clear that removing the death penalty has not increased the murder rate. To
the contrary, that rate is declining. The compromise I propose is a
significant step in the reform of sentencing for murder. I believe it is also
more likely to be accepted by the public than simply putting murder
sentencing on par with that of manslaughter and attempted murder.
Abolishing the mandatory life sentence for murder and allowing an
unfettered judicial discretion may ultimately be the sentencing option we
choose for murder. However, we may need to approach this result
gradually. Experience Ath the regime proposed in this article could provide
us with data with which to assess whether judges can use this more limited
discretion appropriately. If so, then the public and legislators could be more
confident in allowing judges more complete discretion.
Some will be concerned that any movement towards fleibility for
murder sentencing will lead to an increase in the murder rate. We survived
abolition of the death penalty with no increase in murder rates, and in fact
saw a decrease. I am confident that we could also survive the above
proposed regime.

144 Code, supra note 4, s. 71S.2.

